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1 Introduction
The theory of games with vector payoffs is concerned with situations in which a
number of players must take into account several objectives, each of which depends
on the decision of all players. This type of game was introduced by Blackwell (1956).
Subsequently, Shapley (1959) presented the natural extensions of the concept of
Nash equilibrium, (Nash 1951), for two-person zero-sum finite games with vector
payoffs: strong equilibria and weak equilibria, which are the basic concepts in multi-
objective games. Among the authors who have studied the existence of equilibria
for this kind of game are Zeleny (1975), Corley (1985), and Borm et al. (1988). For
general n-person multi-objective games, the first results on the existence of equilibria
were established in Zhao (1991). Interesting work on the topic includes Voorneveld
et al. (1999), Bade (2005), and Patriche (2014).
The present paper is also devoted to the analysis of equilibria of n-person non-
cooperative games where the payoffs of the agents are multi-dimensional. We call
them games with vector-valued utilities. These games represent situations in which
the preferences of the agents on the results of the interactions are incomplete. In the
existing literature on models with incomplete preferences, the two classic references
are Aumann (1962) and Bewley (1986). More recently, this decisional framework
has been studied from various viewpoints. In particular, certain authors have es-
tablished a formal connection between incomplete preferences and multi-objective
decision-making under certainty and risk (Ok, 2002; Dubra et al., 2004; Sagi, 2006).
The fundamental difficulty is the impossibility of representing incomplete preferences
in terms of utility functions, and hence the application range remains limited. This is
the main cause of the scarcity of results in this line of research. However, as shown in
Ok (2002), under certain not particularly restrictive hypotheses, incomplete prefer-
ences can be represented by means of vector-valued utility functions. This approach
causes no loss of information and enables these situations to be studied from an
analytical standpoint by using the well-developed theory of vector optimization in
the operations research literature. The literature on incomplete preferences mainly
deals with issues of individual choice, and only a few papers address non-cooperative
models of interaction between agents with incomplete preferences. Some exceptions
of note are found in Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975), Bade (2005), and Park (2015).
As mentioned in Bade (2005), one argument for studying games with vector-
valued utilities is the possibility of addressing cases in which agents do have weighted
utilities over multiple criteria but the modeler, as an outside observer, remains
2
unaware of agents’ weights. In these situations, the set of equilibria of the game
modeled as a vector-valued game will always include the equilibria of the actual
game.
An alternative interpretation of the equilibria in this model is that the agents are
uncertain about their own weights and they will only deviate when the deviation gain
is positive for every possible weight vector. Nevertheless, in either interpretation,
it is also possible that the agents’ weights are known to belong to certain subsets,
in which case the incorporation of this information into the model should lead to
predictions that are better adjusted.
In the present paper, we initially adopt the formal framework in Bade (2005)
to model n-person games with incomplete preferences that can be represented by
a vector of utility functions. In Bade’s paper, the equilibria for these games are
characterized in terms of the equilibria of weighted games under reasonable con-
cavity assumptions. Her results are then applied to identify the sets of equilibria
in several examples from oligopoly theory. However, the set of equilibria of games
with incomplete preferences may contain a large number of strategy profiles, some
of which may not represent realistic predictions. For this reason, the first goal of our
research is to present a procedure to obtain a number of refinements of the set of
equilibria based on partial preference information. Thus, we can study which kind of
predictions are derived from the information available without requiring additional
assumptions about the utility functions of the agents.
In order to deal with partial information, we need to rely on the weak exten-
sion of the standard concept of the Nash equilibrium (see Shapley, 1959; Wang,
1993; Voorneveld et al., 1999). The adoption of this extension is not, in general, a
drawback, since the sets of strong equilibria and weak equilibria often coincide. In
fact, under certain concavity assumptions, the two concepts of equilibrium coincide.
When they do not, the difference usually lies on boundary points.
A first interesting result is the characterization of equilibria in terms of the
reaction functions of the components of the utility. This result is relevant from an
operational point of view, and will recursively be applied throughout the paper for
the identification of equilibria.
We assume that the underlying incomplete preferences of the agents can be
represented by weighted additive value functions where weights may be interpreted
as the relative importance that the agents assign to the components of their vector
utility functions. The equilibria of the game are then identified with the equilibria of
the corresponding weighted games. In this framework, information about preferences
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is formalized by means of sets of weights which, in general, are different for each
agent. A central result is established which identifies the set of equilibria of the
game with partial preference information with the set of equilibria of a transformed
vector-valued game.
The inclusion of agents’ preferences into the model through admissible weights
provides the equilibria in accordance with these preferences. However, it is often
the case that the agents, even when they admit that a certain set of weights are
possible, might also exhibit a conservative attitude with respect to the results they
will eventually achieve. Empirical evidence that agents are more uncertainty-averse
than uncertainty-loving can be found, for instance, in Wakker (2001). More recently,
Kozhan and Salmon (2009) found significant evidence of uncertainty aversion in the
foreign exchange market.
Thus, we apply a worst-case analysis based on the well-known maxmin criterion
proposed by Wald (1950), and adapted to partial preference information (see also
Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). We propose a refinement based on a rule by which
the agents select their decisions by maximizing the worst evaluation from among
those provided by the feasible weights in their information sets.
A second goal of this paper is to show the potential of this analysis for the study
of non-cooperative economic models. The theoretical results herein developed have
been applied to a relevant type of decision-making process with interacting agents.
We have extended the analysis of standard oligopoly models from firms that only
consider the maximization of their own profits to a more realistic situation where
firms incorporate additional goals.
We have focused on mixed oligopoly models. Traditionally, these models are
those that consider private firms that are profit maximizers and public firms with
social goals. Since the seminal paper of Merrill and Schneider (1966) appeared,
there has been a growing literature concerning several aspects and implications of
mixed duopolies in the markets (see De Fraja and Del Bono, 1989, 1990) and the
references therein). Nevertheless, the literature on the topic usually excludes profit
maximization from the goals of the social firms.
Our approach is more flexible and permits the analysis of firms with social objec-
tives which do not completely abandon the pursuit of maximum profits that ensures
their permanence in the market. We specifically analyze the case of mixed duopoly
under various assumptions about the firms’ objectives and present the results and
interpretations regarding the sets of equilibria.
The following notation will be used. Let IR(IR+) denote the set of all (non-
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negative) real numbers and let IRk(IRk+) be the k-fold Cartesian product of IR(IR+).
The origin of IRk is 0k and 1k is a k-dimensional vector with components equal to
one. We use conventional notation for the comparison of vectors: x = y means that
xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, . . . , k; x ≥ y indicates that x ≥ y and x 6= y; and x > y
indicates that xi > yi for all i = 1, . . . , k. By x · y we denote the scalar product of
vectors x, y ∈ IRk, that is, x · y =∑ki=1 xiyi.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the concepts of equilib-
ria and weak equilibria for n-person games with vector-valued utility functions are
stated and their relationship with the equilibria of weighted games is investigated.
In Section 3, we present refinements of the equilibria by incorporating information
about the preferences of the agents into the model. Section 4 is devoted to the
analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the firms pursue additional goals to those of
maximizing profits. Section 5 is devoted to setting out the conclusions. Proofs are
contained in an Appendix.
2 Equilibria in games with vector-valued utilities
This section is devoted to the study of the set of equilibria of n-person games with
vector-valued utility functions.
A vector-valued normal-form game is represented by G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N}, where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents, Ai is the set of strategies that agent i ∈
N can adopt and the mapping ui : ×i∈NAi → IRsi is the vector-valued utility
function of agent i, ui := (ui1, . . . , u
i
si), where s
i is the number of components of
the utility function of agent i. We denote by J i = {1, ..., si} the set of indices
of such components. A profile of strategies, a = (a1, . . . , an), with ai ∈ Ai, for
a game G can be written as a = (ai, a−i), where ai is a strategy of agent i, and
a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an) stands for the strategy combination of all players
except player i.
The following definitions are extensions of the concept of Nash equilibrium for
these games with vector-valued utilities. They were introduced by Shapley (1959)
for finite two-person zero-sum games.
Definition 2.1. An action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) is a weak equilibrium for the
game with vector-valued utilities G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} if /∃ i ∈ N with ai ∈ Ai such
that ui(ai, a∗−i) > ui(a∗).
The set of all weak equilibria of game G is denoted by Ew(G).
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A weak equilibrium does not necessarily yield the best overall result for all agents.
However, in a weak equilibrium, agents cannot improve all the components of their
utilities by deviating independently.
The other extension of the concept of Nash equilibrium is stronger than the first
extension:
Definition 2.2. An action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) is an equilibrium for the game
with vector-valued utilities G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} if /∃ i ∈ N with ai ∈ Ai such that
ui(ai, a∗−i) ≥ ui(a∗i, a∗−i).
The set of all equilibria of game G is denoted by E(G).
Note that both Definition 2.1 and Definition 2.2 reduce to the standard definition
of Nash equilibrium when the utility function of each agent is a real-valued function.
The set of weak equilibria and the set of equilibria only slightly differ. Under
certain concavity conditions1, which often hold in applications, both sets coincide.
When these sets are different, the set of equilibria can exclude some of the boundary
points, which are included in the set of weak equilibria.
Let rij denote the correspondence of best response of agent i in relation to the
j-th utility component. Note that for each a−i ∈ A−i, rij(a−i) ⊆ Ai. The best
response of an agent to the actions of all the others may not exist and when it
does, it is possibly not a singleton. However, under certain conditions on the set of
strategies and on the concavity of the utility functions, it is possible to identify the
set of equilibria of the game with multi-dimensional utilities in terms of the reaction
function of the components as shown in the following result.
Theorem 2.3. If Ai is a non-empty convex compact subset Ai ⊆ IR for all i ∈ N ,
and uij is continuous and strictly concave in its own action for each j ∈ J i, then the
set of equilibria of the game with vector-valued utilities G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} is
E(G) = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ×i∈NAi : ri(a−i) ≤ ai ≤ r¯i(a−i), i ∈ N},
where ri(a−i) = minj∈Ji rij(a
−i), and r¯i(a−i) = maxj∈Ji rij(a
−i).
Under the hypothesis of strict concavity of the components of the utility, the
set of equilibria and the set of weak equilibria coincide. This hypothesis can be
relaxed to concavity, giving rise to a similar result which characterizes the set of
1For instance, a sufficient condition for the two sets to coincide is that the sets Ai are non-empty
convex subsets of a finite dimensional space, and the functions uij are strictly concave in a
i.
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weak equilibria in terms of the minimum and of the maximum of the best responses,
by slightly modifying the definition of rij(a
−i) and rij(a
−i) when some of the best
responses are not a singleton.
2.1 Weighted games and equilibria
In a game with vector-valued utilities, the preferences of the agents on the profiles
of strategies are incomplete. The literature on vector-valued optimization problems
has focused on the case where the preferences of the agents are represented by
additive value functions since this type of function permits the representation of
preferences under not very restrictive assumptions (see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
In this paper, we also assume that the preferences of each agent can be represented
by a weighted additive value function. The weights represent trade-offs between the
various components of the utility, and can be interpreted as the relative importance
that this agent assigns to the components of his/her vector-utility function.
When complete information about the importance of the components is available,
then the preferences of each agent are represented by a value function determined
by a unique vector of weights, and the problem of equilibria identification in the
vector-valued game is reduced to the identification of equilibria in scalar games.
Formally, given a vector of preference weights for agent i, λi ∈ ∆si = {λi ∈ IRsi :∑si
j=1 λ
i
j = 1, λ
i
j ≥ 0}, the value of the action profile a ∈ ×ni=1Ai for agent i is given
by
∑si
j=1 λ
i
ju
i
j(a). Consider ∆ = ×ni=1∆si . For λ ∈ ∆, we define the normal-form
weighted game Gλ = {(Ai, viλ)i∈N} with
viλ(a) =
si∑
j=1
λiju
i
j(a).
The concept of equilibrium for the scalar game Gλ is the following.
Definition 2.4. For λ ∈ ∆, an action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) is a Nash equilib-
rium for the game Gλ if /∃ i ∈ N with ai ∈ Ai such that vλ(ai, a∗−i) > vλ(a∗).
E(Gλ) denotes the set of Nash equilibria for the weighted gameGλ = {(Ai, viλ)i∈N}.
Note that we can write viλ(a) = λ
i · ui(a). Definition 2.4 can alternatively be
written as: a∗ is a Nash equilibrium for the game Gλ if for each i ∈ N , λi · ui(a∗) ≥
λi · ui(ai, a∗−i), for all ai ∈ Ai.
In vector-valued games, if the agents consider all the possible values of weights,
then all the additive representations of preferences are taken into account. Bade
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(2005) establishes the relationship between the set of equilibria of the game and the
set of equilibria of the weighted games with positive weights and with non-negative
weights. She shows that if the utility functions of all players are concave in their
own actions, and all action spaces are convex, then
∪{E(Gλ) : λ ∈ ∆+} ⊆ E(G) ⊆ ∪{E(Gλ) : λ ∈ ∆}.
where ∆+ = {λ ∈ ∆ : λij > 0, i ∈ N, j ∈ J i}.
This result provides an upper and a lower bound on the set of all equilibria of
the vector-valued game. However, these two sets that bound the set of equilibria,
seldom differ. Indeed, if component-wise strict concavity is assumed, the three sets
coincide.
On the other hand, Wang (1993) states that the equilibria of weighted games with
non-negative weights are weak equilibria for the game with vector-valued utilities,
that is,
∪{E(Gλ) : λ ∈ ∆} ⊆ Ew(G).
This inclusion may be strict, that is, weak equilibria may exist that cannot be de-
termined by using additive value functions. However, under concavity assumptions,
the two sets coincide, as established in the following result.
Theorem 2.5. Let G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} be a game with vector-valued utilities such
that each Ai is a non-empty convex subset of a finite dimensional space and for each
i, ui is concave in ai, then
∪{E(Gλ) : λ ∈ ∆} = Ew(G).
This result constitutes a generalization of that established by Shapley (1959) for
finite games with vector payoffs.
Moreover, when the components of ui are strictly concave functions, and the
strategy sets are convex, then the set of equilibria coincides with the set of weak
equilibria of all weighted games. This fact follows from our former result and from
Theorem 3 in Bade (2005).
3 Equilibria with preference information
The identification of all equilibria is not always useful in operational terms, given the
large number of equilibria that may exist. In addition, depending on the situation,
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not all equilibria are necessarily likely to be adopted by the agents. It is therefore
valuable to study the appropriate refinements of the notion of equilibrium when
additional considerations are incorporated.
An intermediate situation between the case of certainty about the preference
weights and complete uncertainty is when certain information on these parameters
is available. The information can be formalized by means of information sets, which
in general are different for each agent. We explore the effects of including these
information sets into the analysis with the aim of determining the equilibria which
are in accordance with the agents’ preference information.
Consider a subset of weights for each agent, Λi ⊆ ∆si , representing partial in-
formation on the preference weights of agent i. Denote by Λ = ×i∈NΛi the set
containing the preference information of all the agents.
Definition 3.1. Let G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} be a game with vector-valued utilities. An
action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) is an equilibrium for the game with preference
information Λ ⊆ ∆si if, for each i ∈ N , λi ∈ Λi exists such that viλ(a∗) ≥ viλ(ai, a∗−i)
for all ai ∈ Ai.
The set of equilibria of the game with preference information Λ is denoted EΛ(G).
In other words, a∗ is an equilibrium for the game with preference information if
a∗ is an equilibrium of the weighted game for some λ ∈ Λ.
In the absence of information, the information sets are Λi = ∆s
i
for all i ∈ N ,
and, under the assumptions of Theorem 2.5, the set of all weak equilibria is obtained.
It is easy to prove that if Λ′ ⊂ Λ, then EΛ′(G) ⊆ EΛ(G). As a consequence, the
refinement of the preference information yields a reduction of the set of equilibria.
The limit case is when preference information reduces to a vector of weights for
each agent. The preference relation is then complete and the equilibria correspond
to the standard Nash equilibria for the real-valued utilities of the agents. Note that
if the set of information only contains positive weights, then the equilibria with
preference information are equilibria of the game with vector-valued utilities. That
is, if Λ ⊆ ∆+, then EΛ(G) ⊆ E(G).
We are interested in certain special sets of weights, particularly those which can
be described by linear relations. In these cases, the information sets are polyhedra,
and thus they can be characterized by their extreme points.
The following two results are extensions to the more general framework of those
results stated in Section 2. They permit us to incorporate results from games with
complete preferences into the theory of games with incomplete preferences, and they
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allow the identification of the equilibria which are in accordance with the available
preference information.
For i ∈ N , let Λi be a polyhedron with pi extreme points {λ¯(1), . . . λ¯(pi)}, and
let Bi be the pi × si matrix whose rows are the extreme points of Λi. For each
i ∈ N , define a function, viΛ, with values in IRpi , given by viΛ = Bi · ui. Denote by
GΛ = {(Ai, viΛ)i∈N} the transformed vector-valued game.
Proposition 3.2. Let G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} be a game with vector-valued utilities.
Then
EΛ(G) ⊆ Ew(GΛ).
The following is a central result. It states that, under concavity conditions, the
reverse is true, that is, it identifies the set of equilibria of the game with partial
preference information with the set of weak equilibria of the transformed game.
Theorem 3.3. Let G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} be a game with vector-valued utilities such
that each Ai is a non-empty convex subset of a finite dimensional space and for each
i ∈ N , ui is concave in ai. Then,
EΛ(G) = E
w(GΛ).
3.1 Conservative equilibria
A conservative attitude is one of the most usual behaviors of the agents when assess-
ing possible outcomes (see for instance, Wakker, 2001; Kozhan and Salmon, 2009).
We now present an analysis of the equilibria of the game with vector-valued utilities
that can be appropriate when the agents are averse to the uncertainty underlying
the weights assigned to the components of the utility. We therefore assume that
the agents’ assessment of the results is based on the worst-case scenario, and by
adopting a conservative attitude, the agents seek to guarantee the best results from
among the worst expectations.
Thus, we consider a conservative value function. Each agent i evaluates an action
profile a as the minimum weighted value among all the feasible weights in Λi. That
is, the value function of agent i is:
vcΛi(a) = min
λi∈Λi
si∑
j=1
λiju
i
j(a).
10
Note that since the sets of information are polyhedral and the minimum of a
linear function on a polyhedron is reached at one of its extreme points, then the
value function vcΛi only depends on the extreme points of Λ
i. Formally, given the
polyhedron of weights Λi ⊆ ∆si with extreme points λ¯i(r), r = 1, ..., pi, the value
function is
vcΛi(a) = min
r=1,...,pi
{viλ¯(r)(a)}.
The decision rule consisting of the maximization of this value function constitutes
the extension of the well-known max-min criterion (Wald, 1950) for the case of
preference information. This extended rule is also formally related with the analysis
of max-min expected utility developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
In this conservative setting, the appropriate concept of equilibrium is the follow-
ing.
Definition 3.4. An action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) is a conservative equilibrium
for the game with preference information Λ if /∃ i ∈ N with ai ∈ Ai such that
vcΛi(a
i, a∗−i) > vcΛi(a
∗).
EcΛ(G) denotes the set of conservative equilibrium of the game G with preference
information Λ.
Equivalently, a∗ ∈ EcΛ(G) if for all i ∈ N , vcΛi(ai, a∗−i) ≤ vcΛi(a∗), for all ai ∈ Ai.
A first question to answer is whether conservative equilibria as defined above are
equilibria for the game with preference information, as defined in 3.1. The answer
is affirmative under the conditions stated in the following result.
Proposition 3.5. Let G = {(Ai, ui)i∈N} be a game with vector-valued utilities. If
Ai is a non-empty convex subset of a finite dimensional space and, for each i ∈ N ,
ui is concave in ai, then EcΛ(G) ⊆ EΛ(G).
Note that if functions uij are continuous then v
c
Λi is continuous, although it is not
differentiable in certain subsets of the strategy sets. Nevertheless, if functions uij are
concave, then vcΛi is also concave and the existence of a conservative equilibrium is
guaranteed as a consequence of the well-known existence results.
4 Mixed duopoly with various objectives
In this section, we consider two firms with several objectives competing in the same
industry. Each firm is primarily concerned with its own benefit, but considers a
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second goal. One of the firms is also a maximizer of the industry profit, i.e., it
also takes into account the benefit of the industry as a whole. The other firm is a
socially responsible firm that is concerned not only with its profit, but also with social
welfare. In this sense, the second firm has features of a public firm and therefore
we have a case within the so-called mixed duopoly models. Although the research
in this type of duopoly goes back to Merrill and Schneider (1966), the expansion
of the literature regarding this model starts in the 80’s with the contribution of De
Fraja and Del Bono (1989). The main innovation of our analysis with respect to the
previous literature is that the social firm maintains the maximization of profits as
one of its objectives.
The key element in the analysis is that the firm cannot compare in monetary
terms the results obtained when it tries to achieve each of the two goals. An ad-
ditional monetary unit of profit for the firm itself does not have the same meaning
as an additional monetary unit in either the industrial profit or in social welfare,
moreover, there is no clear way to aggregate their values. Therefore, the analysis of
this mixed duopoly with firms trying to achieve various objectives is formalized in
this section as a game with vector-valued utilities.
The two firms of the industry compete in quantities under Cournot assumptions
and produce a homogeneous commodity. They face an inverse demand function
given by p = P (Q), where Q = q1 + q2 is the total quantity produced in the market.
Following the standard in the literature (see Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983), we as-
sume that the function P (Q) is twice-continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing,
concave, and non-negative on some bounded interval (0, K), and that P (Q) = 0 for
Q ≥ K.
Firms are allowed to select any non-negative quantity. However, it could be
argued that extremely large quantities are not feasible and so should not be included
in a firm’s strategy space. Therefore, the strategy spaces should be bounded. We
also assume that each Ai is closed. Thus, the strategy set of each firm is represented
by a closed interval, Ai = [0, ki], i = 1, 2. For simplicity, it is assumed that firms
have no fixed costs and that their marginal costs are equal to zero. Under these
assumptions, the quantity K corresponds to the perfect competition quantity. In
addition, we assume that the reservation price and market size are finite.
For i = 1, 2, the first objective for firm i is its profit ui1(q
1, q2) = qiP (q1 + q2).
Note that the profit function of each firm is strictly concave in its own action, since
∂2ui1
∂qi∂qi
(q1, q2) < 0. As a consequence, given the action of one of the firms in the
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corresponding interval (0, ki), the profit of the other attains its maximum where its
derivative is null. For qj ∈ (0, ki), the optimal response function of firm i to the
action of firm j, denoted by ri1(q
j), is implicitly defined by the following equation.
P (q1 + q2) + qiP ′(q1 + q2) = 0.
For qj ≥ K, the optimal response function is defined as ri1(qj) = 0. Under our
initial assumptions on the inverse demand functions, the reaction functions, ri1, are
non-increasing and strictly decreasing over the range where it is strictly positive,
and continuously differentiable (see Kreps and Scheikman, 1983). Moreover, these
assumptions guarantee the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium.
However, firms are not only concerned with their own profit. They consider an
additional objective related to the welfare of the other economic agents, consumers
and firms, and this also affects the development of the firm. Firm 1 is interested in
the profit of the whole industry, defined as the joint benefit of the firms involved.
A higher industrial benefit can be interpreted by the firm as a signal of a good
performance of the industry, that could eventually have a positive impact on all
firms. On the other hand, we have regarded Firm 2 as a socially responsible firm in
the sense that it takes into account the welfare of all agents. Therefore, its second
objective is social welfare which includes both the joint benefit of the two firms and
the consumer surplus.
Since the objectives of Firm 1 are related to its own benefit and the industrial
profit, the components of the utility of Firm 1 are its own benefit and the average
benefit of the two firms that make up the industry, u12(q
1, q2) = q
1+q2
2
P (q1 + q2), and
therefore, the vector-valued utility of Firm 1 is
u1(q1, q2) = (q1P (Q),
Q
2
P (Q)).
Firm 2 is concerned with its own benefit and with social welfare. The social
welfare function is modeled as the sum of the joint benefit of the two firms and the
consumer surplus. Thus, the function that evaluates social welfare is u22(q
1, q2) =
CS(q1 + q2) + (q1 + q2)P (q1 + q2). Therefore, the vector-valued utility of Firm 2 is
u2(q1, q2) = (q2P (Q), CS(Q) +QP (Q)).
Under the assumptions on the inverse demand function, all the functions rep-
resenting the objectives of each firm are strictly concave in the action of the cor-
responding firm. It is easy to see that
∂2u12
∂q1∂q1
(q1, q2) < 0, and that the optimal
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Figure 1: The set of equilibria of the mixed duopoly
response of Firm 1 to the actions of Firm 2, denoted r12(q
2), is r12(q
2) = QM − q2,
where QM is the monopoly quantity, that is to say, the quantity maximizing QP (Q).
Regarding the social welfare function, u22, note that
u22(q
1, q2) = CS(q1 + q2) + (q1 + q2)P (q1 + q2) =
∫ q1+q2
0
P (x)dx.
Therefore,
∂u22
∂q2
(q1, q2) = P (q1 +q2), and
∂2u22
∂q2∂q2
(q1, q2) = P ′(q1 +q2) < 0. It follows
that u22 is also strictly concave in q
2. Since
∂u22
∂q2
(q1, q2) = P (q1+q2), then the optimal
response of Firm 2 to the actions of Firm 1, denoted r22(q
1), is r22(q
1) = QPC − q1,
where QPC is the perfect competition quantity.
It follows from Theorem 2.3 that the set of equilibria of the game with vector-
valued utilities representing the mixed duopoly, G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2}, can be described
in terms of the best responses as
E(G) = {(q1, q2) : QM − q2 ≤ q1 ≤ r11(q2), r21(q1) ≤ q2 ≤ QPC − q1}.
Note, that as a consequence of the strict concavity of the components of the
utility, the set of equilibria coincides with the set of weak equilibria.
In order to simplify the presentation, we will graphically illustrate the results
with examples in which the inverse demand functions are linear, that is P (Q) =
a− b(q1 + q2). The shaded area in Figure 1 shows the set of equilibria. Dashed lines
represent the reaction function corresponding to the components of the utilities of
Firm 1. Solid lines are the reactions of the components of the utility of Firm 2.
Since the equilibrium outcomes of the extended Cournot model must lie within
this area, a wide range of action profiles cannot be equilibria. Note that the set of
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equilibria includes the original Cournot equilibrium. In any of the equilibria, the
firm that maximizes industry profit will offer no more than what it would offer if it
only considered its individual profit. By contrast, the socially responsible firm will
always offer at least its Cournot quantity.
4.1 An additional objective concerning market share
In this subsection, we analyze a situation in which Firm 1, apart from the objectives
considered before (individual profit and average benefit of both firms), also takes an
objective concerning market share into account. Specifically, the firm wishes that
its offer constitutes a certain proportion of the quantity offered by the other firm.
In order to formalize this additional objective, a new component for the utility of
Firm 1 is defined2, u13(q
1, q2) = −(q1−αq2)2, for α > 0. The parameter α may have
interesting interpretations. A firm strives to ensure a minimum market share against
its competitor should select a value of α below one. A value of α greater than one
could be interpreted as an entry deterrence strategy against potential competitors
or as a signal of an expansive strategy of the firm, in an effort to achieve a dominant
position in the market with the long-term advantages that this would entail.
For Firm 2, the objectives are the same as above. Thus, the corresponding
vector-valued game is Gˆ = {(Ai, uˆi)i=1,2}, where
uˆ1(q1, q2) = (q1P (Q),
Q
2
P (Q),−(q1 − αq2)2).
uˆ2(q1, q2) = (q2P (Q), CS(Q) +QP (Q)).
The best response function for the new component u13(q
1, q2) = −(q1 − αq2)2 is
rˆ13(q
2) = αq2. Theorem 2.3 can also be applied in order to identify the expanded set
of equilibria.
E(Gˆ) = {(q1, q2) : ri(qj) ≤ qi ≤ r¯i(qj), i = 1, 2},
with r1(q2) = minj=1,2,3{r1j (q2)}, r¯1(q2) = maxj=1,2,3{r1j (q2)}, r2(q1) = minj=1,2{r2j (q1)},
and r¯2(q1) = maxj=1,2{r2j (q1)}.
Figure 2 represents the expanded set of equilibria for the case of linear demand
functions when α = 1, that is, when Firm 1 wishes to equalize the offer of Firm 2.
The dashed line represents r1(q2) and the dotted line r¯1(q2). With the incorporation
of this additional objective into the game, new equilibria emerge. In fact, in this
2Other representations of this objective exist. However, this form is convenient for our analysis.
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q1
q2
r¯1
r¯2
r1
r2
E(Gˆ)
Figure 2: Equilibria of the mixed duopoly with an additional objective
new situation, it is obtained that, unlike the above case with two objectives, there
are equilibria where both firms produce above the Cournot quantity.
4.2 The mixed duopoly with preference information
In this subsection, we turn back to our original mixed duopoly where each firm
takes into account two objectives, G = {(Ai, ui)i=1,2}. We assume that there is
information available about the relative importance of the objectives that the agents
are considering.
In our model, we represent a situation in which Firm 1 gives more relevance
to its first objective and therefore an additional unit of its own benefit is at least
as important as an additional unit of average industrial profit. For Firm 2, the
importance of its second objective is no less than that of the first objective, and
thus an additional unit of social benefit is at least as relevant as an additional unit
of individual benefit. This brings us closer to the traditional mixed oligopoly model,
where there is a private firm that maximizes its own profit and a public firm that is
only concerned about social welfare.
Formally, the information sets for Firm 1 and Firm 2 are respectively: Λ1 =
{λ1 ∈ ∆2 : λ11 ≥ λ12}, Λ2 = {λ2 ∈ ∆2 : λ22 ≥ λ21}. The extreme points of these sets
of information are (1, 0), (1/2, 1/2) for Λ1 and (1/2, 1/2), (0, 1) for Λ2. Theorem 3.3
permits us to compute the set of equilibria of the game with partial information as
the weak equilibria of a transformed game with vector-valued utilities {(Ai, viΛ)i=1,2},
where
v1Λ(q
1, q2) = (q1P (Q),
1
4
(3q1 + q2)P (Q)).
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r22
r12
r21
q1
q2
E⇤(G)
Figure 3: Reaction sets and equilibria with preference information
v2Λ(q
1, q2) = ((
q1
2
+ q2)P (Q) +
CS(Q)
2
, CS(Q) +QP (Q)).
Note that, since they consist of convex combinations of strictly concave functions,
the components of this transformed game are also strictly concave in the action of
the corresponding firm. Thus, the set of equilibria and the set of weak equilibria of
the game {(Ai, viΛ)i=1,2} coincide.
For the components of this transformed game, the best response functions are
rˆ11(q
2) = QM − q2 and rˆ22(q1) = QPC − q1 (they coincide with r11(q2) and r22(q1),
respectively). On the other hand, rˆ12(q
2) and rˆ21(q
1) are obtained implicitly from
3P (Q) + (3q1 + q2)P ′(Q) = 0, 2P (Q) + q2P ′(Q) = 0.
For the linear case, the new reaction functions and the set of equilibria are
represented in Figure 3. Note that the new set of equilibria does not include the
Cournot equilibrium. In comparison with the set of equilibria with no preference
information, the quantity offered by Firm 1 is equal or less, and the quantity offered
by Firm 2 is equal or greater.
In order to handle different degrees of importance for the components of the
utilities, the information sets considered above can be generalized in the following
sense: Λ1 = {λ1 ∈ ∆2 : λ11 ≥ βλ12}, Λ2 = {λ2 ∈ ∆2 : λ22 ≥ δλ21}, where β, δ ≥ 0.
The extreme points are (1, 0) and ( β
β+1
, 1
β+1
) for Λ1, and ( 1
δ+1
, δ
δ+1
) and (0, 1) for Λ2.
The transformed game is defined by the following vector-valued functions:
v1Λ(q
1, q2) = (q1P (Q),
1
2(β + 1)
((2β + 1)q1 + q2)P (Q)).
v2Λ(q
1, q2) = (q2 +
δ
δ + 1
q1)P (Q) + δCS(Q), CS(Q) +QP (Q)).
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For the case of linear demand, the reaction functions are
rˆ11(q
2) =
a
2b
−q
2
2
, rˆ12(q
2) =
a
2b
−2β + 2
2β + 1
q2, rˆ21(q
1) =
a
b
1 + δ
2 + δ
−1 + δ
2 + δ
q1, rˆ22(q
2) =
a
b
−q1.
The different values that the parameters can adopt determine the size of the set
of equilibria. Note that the smaller the parameter, the wider the sets. For β = 0 and
δ = 0, the original set of equilibria, represented in Figure 1, is obtained. For high
values of these parameters, the relevance of one of the objectives vanishes and the set
of equilibria tends to be a singleton in which Firm 2 offers the perfect competition
quantity and Firm 1 abandons the market.
4.3 Conservative firms
Another situation can arise when, apart from the information on preference weights,
the firms show an attitude towards possible outcomes. We can assume that the firms
adopt a conservative criterion, and, for each profile of strategies, they look at the
worst weighted value from among those obtained with weights in its information set.
For the former mixed duopoly with preference information described by the sets
Λ1 = {λ1 ∈ ∆2 : λ11 ≥ λ12} and Λ2 = {λ2 ∈ ∆2 : λ22 ≥ λ21}, assume that the firms
are conservative, in the sense that the evaluation of a pair of strategies consists of
the worst weighted value from among those obtained with weights in Λ1 and Λ2. In
this situation, the value function for Firm 1 is
vcΛ
1(q1, q2) = Min{ q1P (Q), 1
4
(3q1 + q2)P (Q) }.
vcΛ
1(q1, q2) =

q1P (q1 + q2) when q1 ≤ q2
1
4
(3q1 + q2)P (q1 + q2) when q2 ≤ q1.
This function is not differentiable when q1 = q2. In order to describe the reaction
function, the partition of the space of strategies has to be taken into account.
The conservative value function for Firm 2 is
vcΛ
2(q1, q2) = Min{(q
1
2
+ q2)P (Q) +
CS(Q)
2
, CS(Q) +QP (Q)} =
= (
q1
2
+ q2)P (Q) +
CS(Q)
2
, for all (q1, q2).
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q1
q2
Ec⇤(G)
Figure 4: Conservative equilibrium with preference information
For the linear case, Figure 4 illustrates the reaction function of Firm 1 in dashed lines,
the reaction function of Firm 2 in solid lines and the unique conservative equilibrium
attained at EcΛ(G) = {(
a
4b
,
a
2b
)}. Note that the total equilibrium quantity is greater
than the quantity offered when both firms are traditional profit maximizers.
For the generalized sets of weights Λ1 = {λ1 ∈ ∆2 : λ11 ≥ βλ12}, Λ2 = {λ2 ∈
∆2 : λ22 ≥ δλ21}, a unique conservative equilibrium always exists and is given by
(q1∗, q2∗) = (
1
3 + δ
a
b
,
1 + δ
3 + δ
a
b
). Note that in this case, the conservative equilibrium
does not depend on the value of β, that is, the relevance of the first objective
with respect to the second objective for Firm 1 does not affect the conservative
equilibrium. When δ tends towards zero, the conservative equilibrium becomes the
Cournot equilibrium. As δ increases, the total quantity offered in the market tends
to be the perfect competition quantity and is only provided by Firm 2.
5 Conclusions
We present an innovative analysis of non-cooperative games with vector-valued util-
ity functions. These games have a high potential to represent situations in which the
agents act strategically in order to achieve several goals simultaneously. We have
shown in the paper that this model permits us to accommodate partial information
about the incomplete preferences of the agents in order to attain predictions of the
results of the interaction of a more realistic nature.
Our first result is interesting since it characterizes the whole set of equilibria for
a wide class of these games in terms of the reaction functions of the components
of the vector-utility of the agents, in a similar way to what happens in the case of
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scalar non-cooperative games. This result also facilitates the identification of the
set of equilibria when the agents provide information about their preferences.
The increase of the dimensionality of the agents’ utilities causes new equilibria
to arise, therefore the possibility of refining the set of equilibria becomes a relevant
issue. We focus on the cases in which preferential information consists of sets of
weights described by linear relations. This way of representing information is easily
understood by the agents and is convenient from the operational point of view. In
this sense, our second result identifies the set of equilibria of the vector-valued game
with preference information with the set of equilibria of a transformed game, which,
in general, is also a vector-valued game.
The results are applied to the analysis of a type of mixed duopoly where the
firms consider different social goals but do not completely abandon the pursuit of
maximum benefit which ensures their permanence in the market. The addition
of the new goals expands the set of equilibria. Nevertheless, the incorporation of
preference information and of possible attitudes that can be adopted by the firms
allows us to obtain equilibria in accordance with the information provided. Since
a conservative attitude of the agents is usual in many economic situations, our
approach also explores the possibility of the adoption of a conservative criterion in
order to identify the corresponding equilibria. In this context, for conservative firms,
the equilibrium is unique and it only depends on the relevance that the social firm
gives to each objective.
Our approach is flexible and provides a useful theoretical framework for the
analysis of various situations in the goods and factors markets where economic
agents wish to attain several goals. This is the case for responsible consumers, who
take into account not only their own welfare but also the social and environmental
impact of their consumption decisions. Moreover, in the labour market, the approach
presented in this paper could be helpful in modeling the behavior of trade unions,
which have objectives related to both the welfare of the workers and also to the
welfare of the institution.
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Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, project ECO2015-68856-P
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6 Appendix
Proof Theorem 2.3. First, note that under the assumptions, all the values rij(a
−i)
are well-defined. Let a ∈ ×i∈NAi be a profile of strategies such that for a certain
i ∈ N , ai < ri(a−i). Since uij is strictly concave in its own action, then at ai, uij is
strictly increasing for all j ∈ J i, and by adopting a strategy ai+ε, with ε > 0, agent
i will increase all the components of his utility. Therefore, a is not an equilibrium.
Analogous reasoning can be applied when ai > r¯i(a−i). Let a ∈ ×i∈NAi, such
that ri(a−i) ≤ ai ≤ r¯i(a−i) for all i ∈ N . For i ∈ N , if ri(a−i) = ai = r¯i(a−i), by
moving from his strategy, all the components of the utility of agent i will decrease. If
ri(a−i) < ai < r¯i(a−i), at least one of the inequalities in ri(a−i) ≤ ai ≤ r¯i(a−i) must
be strict. If ri(a−i) < ai, by reducing ai, the utility corresponding to r¯i will decrease.
If ai < r¯i(a−i), by increasing ai, the utility corresponding to ri will decrease.
Proof Theorem 2.5. A first inclusion is proved in Wang (1993). Conversely,
let a∗ ∈ Ew(G). For i ∈ N , define the sets Y i = {x ∈ IRsi : ui(ai, a∗−i) =
x, for some ai ∈ Ai}, and X i = {x ∈ IRsi : ui(a∗) < x}. The sets Y i and X i
are convex and disjoint. Convexity is a consequence of the concavity of ui. To prove
that they are disjoint: If x ∈ Y i then ai ∈ Ai exists such that x 5 ui(ai, a∗−i). If
x ∈ X i then x > ui(a∗). Therefore, if x ∈ Y i ∩X i, then ui(a∗) < x 5 ui(ai, a∗−i),
and ai ∈ Ai exists with ui(a∗) < ui(ai, a∗−i), which contradicts a∗ being a weak
equilibrium of G. It follows from Minkowski’s separating hyperplane theorem that
there exists some non-null vector λi ∈ IRsi and some constant c such that λi · x ≤ c
for all x ∈ Y i, and λi · x ≥ c for all x ∈ X i. It is easy to see that a non-negative λi
and c = λi ·ui(a∗) satisfy this condition. Therefore, for each i ∈ N , λi ·ui(a∗) ≥ λi ·x
for all x ∈ Y i, and since ui(ai, a∗−i) ∈ Y i, for all ai ∈ Ai, a∗i maximizes viλ(ai, a∗−i).
Since only the direction of the vector matters, λi can be taken in ∆s
i
. It follows
that a∗ ∈ E(Gλ).
Proof Proposition 3.2. If a∗ ∈ EΛ(G), then for each i ∈ N there exists
λi ∈ Λi such that a∗ is an equilibrium of game Gλ. It follows from Definition 3.1
that λi · ui(a∗) ≥ λi · ui(ai, a∗−i), for all ai ∈ Ai. On the other hand, for each
i ∈ N , λi ∈ Λi can be written as a convex combination of the extreme points of
Λi, λi =
∑pi
r=1 α
i
rλ¯
i(r) with αir ≥ 0, and
∑pi
r=1 α
i
r = 1. Thus, for each i ∈ N ,∑pi
r=1 α
i
rλ¯
i(r) · ui(a∗) ≥∑pir=1 αirλ¯i(r) · ui(ai, a∗−i) for all ai ∈ Ai. It follows that a∗
is a weak equilibrium of game {(Ai, viΛ)i∈N}.
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Proof Theorem 3.3. A first inclusion is stated in Proposition 3.2. Conversely,
first note that, if for each i, ui is concave in ai, then, viΛ is also concave. Let a
∗ be a
weak equilibrium of game {(Ai, viΛ)i∈N}. It follows from Theorem 2.5 that for each
i ∈ N , αi ∈ ∆pi exists such that∑pir=1 αirλ¯i(r)·ui(a∗) ≥∑pir=1 αirλ¯i(r)·ui(ai, a∗−i) for
all ai ∈ Ai. Since∑pir=1 αirλ¯i(r) ∈ Λi, from Definition 3.1 it follows that a∗ ∈ EΛ(G).
Proof Proposition 3.5. Let a∗ ∈ EcΛ(G) with Λ = ×i∈NΛi. Thus, /∃ i ∈ N
with ai ∈ Ai such that minr=1,...,pi{viλ¯(r)(ai, a∗−i)} > minr=1,...,pi{viλ¯(r)(a∗)}, where
λ¯i(r), r = 1, ..., pi are the extreme points of Λi. Suppose on the contrary that
a∗ 6∈ EΛ(G). Under convexity assumptions, by Theorem 3.3, EΛ(G) = Ew(GΛ).
Hence, a∗ is not a weak equilibrium of the game {(Ai, viΛ)i∈N}. That is, ∃i ∈ N
with ai ∈ Ai such that viΛ(ai, a∗−i) > viΛ(a∗). The components of viΛ are viλ¯(r) for
i = 1, . . . , pi, and therefore vi
λ¯(r)
(ai, a∗−i) > vi
λ¯(r)
(a∗), ∀r = 1, ..., pi. It follows that
minr=1,...,pi{viλ¯(r)(ai, a∗−i)} > minr=1,...,pi{viλ¯(r)(a∗)}, and this contradicts that a∗ is a
conservative equilibrium for the game with preference information Λ.
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